Investigating the Degrowth Paradigm through prospective Modeling by Briens, François & Maïzi, Nadia
 T he development paths followed by a fraction of human-ity in the last decades seem to lead humanity as a whole in 
front of a complex, multi-dimensional crisis. Non-renewable re-
sources depletion and dramatic environmental impacts, includ-
ing climate change issues, seriously question the sustainability 
of the intensive economic metabolism of industrialized socie-
ties as well as the possibility to an everlasting match of the fast-
increasing world energy and material demands.
As a way to address these issues, many take a stand in favor 
of green growth, with the hope that technological progress will 
eventually enable a decoupling of energy and material through-
put and environmental burdens from economic growth. Others 
instead advocate for a specific slowdown of the economic ac-
tivity in high consumption countries: a sustainable Degrowth 
(e. g. Kallis 2011; Bayon et al. 2010).
Is Degrowth voluntary?
Throughout the last decade, significant theoretical work has 
been done to outline the key features of what is now consoli-
dated as a complex and multifaceted political project. For the 
wealthiest countries, where the ecological footprint per cap-
ita is greater than the sustainable global level, Degrowth may 
be envisioned as a voluntary, socially sustainable, equitable, 
smooth downscaling of production and consumption, and thus 
throughput, to an environmentally sustainable level, “that in-
creases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions 
at the local and global level, in the short and long-term” (Kallis/
Schneider 2008).
Another approach is to depict it as a project of transition to-
ward “a society of frugal abundance” (Latouche 2011), a def-
inition that has the merit of challenging a dual presupposi-
tion widely admitted in economics, that is original scarcity and 
boundless human “needs” (Rist 2010).
Modeling for Degrowth
Yet, the possible socio-economic outcomes of such a  project 
still remain uncertain. For instance, while gross domestic prod-
uct degrowth is not per se an objective of Degrowth, it will very 
likely be a consequence of the downscaling of production and 
consumption (Kallis 2011). However, in the current capitalist 
systems, economic growth may not be an option, but rather a 
structural imperative stemming from fundamental institutions 
such as “the use of private property as a collateral, debt, inter-
est rate and credit, and the grow-or-die competition of private 
enterprises for profit and market share” (Kallis 2011). In this 
context, an inversion or a slight slowdown in economic growth 
quickly translates into rising unemployment rates, dramatic so-
cial tensions, poverty and increasing government debt in the 
short term, as well as potential environmental harm in the me-
dium or long term due to lower investments in environmental 
protection or industrial maintenance (Bayon et al. 2010).
Therefore, several questions remain unanswered, for exam-
ple: What concrete proposals could initiate and drive such a 
transition successfully? What could such paths induce in terms 
of energy consumption, waste production and greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission mitigation? What structural or institutional 
obstacles must be overcome and how? Can a welfare state be 
sustained in a degrown economy?
Such complex questions call for careful prospective re-
search. In this respect, we propose an approach relying on ap-
plied modeling as it may bring valuable elements to the debate.
In what follows, we first highlight some important pitfalls 
faced when trying to implement a Degrowth paradigm in an ap-
plied macro-economic modeling framework. Then we describe 
the approach and the model we developed, and finally, briefly 
present an example of how a Degrowth proposal can be imple-
mented in our model.
Preliminary Concerns
Taking an applied modeling approach to Degrowth requires 
specifying two points. Firstly, it has to be defined how De-
growth would concretely be translated and implemented into a 
modeling framework and secondly, the criteria for the assess-
ment of Degrowth scenarios have to be defined.
One possible approach to operationally translate the De-
growth project into elements that can be processed within an 
applied modeling framework is to consider concrete tentative 
political proposals emerging from the Degrowth movements. 
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These reflect a great variety, including for instance taxation or 
pricing mechanisms, but also, and more importantly, cultural 
and fundamental changes in the behavior of economic agents, 
which may bring into question the core aspects of mainstream 
economic theories (e. g. not-for-profit organizations, commons, 
and voluntary simplicity, versus profit and utility maximization). 
Some proposals also suggest a redefinition and reorientation 
of technical progress (e. g. selective moratoria on technologies, 
switching from industrial agriculture to agroecology, small-scale 
and organic farming), while others involve structural changes 
in the economy (e. g. localization), or transformations of funda-
mental institutions such as money and credit. Besides, many of 
these proposals arise from systemic considerations, and are de-
signed and intended to be combined and to work as a system. 
For instance, an unconditional autonomy allowance is seen as 
paired with an income ceiling, and complemented with work-
sharing (Liegey et  al. 2013), while the transformation of the 
money creation system is considered as an indispensable meas-
ure to accompany the expected contraction of the economy (Far-
ley et al. 2013). Hence, exploring Degrowth scenarios and strat-
egies requires simultaneously implementing combinations or 
sets of these proposals of different nature and scale.
A second point to be addressed refers to the choice of appro-
priate criteria for assessing the Degrowth scenarios we want 
to model. This choice remains highly subjective and value-
laden. Therefore, in the absence of a clear consensus, which 
may never exist, the inclusion of a sufficiently broad range of 
detailed indicators of both socio-economic and biophysical na-
tures is welcome. In order to match the minimum require-
ments of value pluralism, this set of indicators should enable 
assessments based on different valuation systems, and make it 
possible to reflect and account for possible trade-offs.
These two points illustrate the complexity of the challenges 
of covering and dealing with the diversity of Degrowth propos-
als and with the variety of the indicators.
When old recipes appear inappropriate
One approach commonly used to provide possible visions 
of the future consists in identifying and extrapolating histori-
cal trends and behaviors. While this option has the advantage of 
providing empirical foundations, it may however quickly show 
its limits for our purpose. Since it relies on statistical stabili-
ties and regularities produced by institutional systems, whose 
own stability is inevitably local and temporary, the validity of 
this approach is generally restricted to local, short-term issues 
(Costanza/Ruth 1998). This is not our case. Degrowth propos-
als imply a joint mutation of values, institutions and structures, 
which may compose a significantly different context with no 
historical precedent, and generate new system behaviors, ren-
dering extrapolative approaches and estimates based on the 
past obsolete. Yet, a retrospective diagnosis remains an indis-
pensable step to identify and understand drivers and inertias 
from the past that may sometimes still occur.
An alternative option lies within micro-funded approaches, 
which aim at determining agents’ behavior from deep parame-
ters, motivations, or rules that are assumed to be policy-invari-
ant and to persist over time. Agent-based models and Computa-
ble General Equilibrium models follow this approach. However, 
suggesting invariant determinants for social agents’ behaviors 
remains a bold and rather arbitrary task, given that human and 
social behaviors always involve plural value systems, which are 
constantly subject to change.
The reductionist utilitarian homo oeconomicus paradigm 
is one such approach and still the most commonly used in 
macro-economic modeling. Theoretically and conceptually 
flawed, misrepresentative and practically inoperative for quan-
titative applied modelling, it is also fundamentally unsuitable 
and irrelevant to the very object of our focus. In particular, it 
excludes a priori pro-social and pro-environmental behaviors 
and lifestyles, leaves no room for options like voluntary sim-
plicity, or ignores or implicitly assumes away psychological 
and social mechanisms or processes that Degrowth proposals 
draw upon. Much more comprehensive conceptual models of 
agents’ behavior would be needed if such an approach is to 
be employed to study Degrowth. However, let alone quantifi-
cation and data availability issues, one can fear that sophisti-
cated behavioral models would introduce a much higher level 
of complexity in the modeling tool, raising further epistemo-
logical issues.
Dealing with uncertainty
This takes us to the core difficulty of our project, which is 
dealing with the inherent dual complicatedness and complex-
ity of societal and ecological systems. A model generally con-
sists in a simplified representation of a perceived, complicated 
or complex subset of reality, whose fundamental aim is to pro-
vide intelligibility. However, on the one hand, drastic simplifi-
cations in models always bear the risk of mutilating reality and 
yielding misleading results. On the other hand, if system com-
plexity may be preserved to some extent, this generally comes at 
the expense of intellectual accessibility (Oreskes 2000). Indeed, 
in many cases developing, using and understanding models 
has remained the privilege of a small community of experts and 
modelers, while outsiders have been left with so called take-
it-or-leave-it results generated by what they see as black boxes 
(Funtowicz/Ravetz 1992).
Developing applied macro-models to explore Degrowth sce-
narios thus requires adopting a delicate compromise between 
representativeness and intelligibility, which takes us back to 
an old dilemma, that is, to paraphrase Paul Valery (1942): “Ce 
qui est simple est toujours faux; ce qui ne l’est pas est inutilis-
able” (what is simple is wrong, what is not is unusable). Given 
that, as Andersson et al. (2013) put it, “no realistic levels of re-
alism beats chaos for very long”, we are inclined to think that 
priority would more usefully be put on intelligibility and trans-
parency here.
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Finally, it also follows from the above that an applied mod-
eling approach to Degrowth cannot dispense with adequate 
management of uncertainty. This may involve short-term sim-
ulations to test models, sensitivity analyses, and the assessment 
of a wide diversity of what-if scenarios reflecting different nar-
ratives, so as to explore the variety of potential outcomes un-
der alternative assumptions, or courses of action or inaction 
(Oreskes 2003).
Description of our approach
Bearing in mind the previous considerations, we have de-
veloped a dynamic simulation macro-model of the French for-
mal economy [1]. Dynamic features may indeed be preferable 
to static or stationary models when exploring the impacts of 
Degrowth proposals that may drive the socio-economic system 
outside its standard conditions of evolution. Where the latters 
might reach unrealistic equilibriums, dynamic models may 
still provide valuable information on the transitory dynamics 
and on the path followed by the system before it reaches crit-
ical states.
In order to capture the impact of qualitative and structural 
changes in lifestyles, institutions and in the economy that De-
growth narratives imply, our model features a sectorial disag-
gregation of the French economy into 37 branches and a de-
tailed representation of the French fiscal apparatus and public 
administration budget. It has been built using public data from 
the French national accounts, and from the French national 
statistics institute (INSEE), mainly for the period from 1978 to 
2012. The model allows us to run medium to long term simu-
lations starting in 2010 and up to 2050 and after.
Describing the model in a nutshell, the production is driven 
by the final demand for each branch, via an input-output anal-
ysis. The level of production for each branch determines the 
amount of investment and labor required, on the basis of hy-
potheses about the evolution of the productive combination. So-
cio-economic outcomes, including employment and unemploy-
ment, inequalities and poverty, public budget balance and debt, 
depend on the choice of working time, public expenditures, 
fiscal and redistributive policies. Energy consumption, GHG 
emissions and waste production are inferred from the produc-
tion structure and level, using intensity coefficients computed 
for each branch, and from detailed hypotheses on the evolution 
of lifestyles. For the sake of simplicity, there is no explicit mon-
etary sector in our model.
With a similar concern for transparency and intelligibility, 
uncertain parameters and relationships related to highly com-
plex or poorly understood mechanisms, or deriving from agents’ 
behaviors and political choices, are kept exogenous and are sub-
ject to sensitivity analyses. This is in particular the case for the 
most organic elements of our model. These are evolution of 
lifestyles, implementation of degrowth-oriented practices and 
possible changes in consumption patterns, from which the fi-
nal demand derives. For such elements, we chose to implement 
participative schemes involving the consultation and participa-
tion of lay citizens through open focus groups. The main ob-
jective of these focus groups is to discuss jointly in what pos-
sible, desirable or acceptable proportions degrowth proposals 
may emerge and diffuse, and consequently, the extent to which 
each component of the demand could evolve. These results, as 
well as additional suggestions from participants, will thus pro-
vide the narrative backbone for scenario building. Embedding 
our macro-economic model into a participative narrative-based 
framework makes it a powerful instrument for social learning 
and consensus building.
The Example of Co-housing
Among the elements brought by this modelling approach, 
one is to carry sensitivity analyses on different parameters af-
fected by Degrowth proposals in order to explore their possible 
socio-economic and environmental impacts, and thus to iden-
tify leverages that could play a key role in a Degrowth transi - 
 tion.
With the example of co-housing, which implicitly involves 
sharing and commoning practices, this proposal can be re-
flected by an evolution of the average size of households. Then, 
discerning the households-proportional from the population-
proportional components of demand makes it possible to ex-
plore the potential impacts of household size. By doing so, we 
find for instance that the low household size projection from 
the INSEE, which corresponds to a trend decline from 2.27 peo-
ple per household in average in 2010 to 2.07 by 2030, induces 
about 3 percent more final energy consumption. It also induces 
about 1.7 percent more GHG emissions in 2030 to match the 
related increase in demand, than if the average household size 
were to remain constant at its 2010 value. On the contrary, com-
ing back to the 1990 average household size, a linear increase 
from 2.27 to 2.59 people per household, would yield lower final 
energy consumption and GHG emissions from production re-
spectively by about 3.9 percent and 2.2 percent with respect to 
the constant household size scenario. This illustrates the po-
tential impact of such non-technical proposals related to life-
style changes.
In the same way, combining different proposals into vari-
ous scenarios will make it possible to study interactions or syn-
ergies, and to identify Degrowth strategies that may have a rel-
evant potential for addressing both environmental and socio-
economic issues.
Conclusion
In order to explore some possible socio-economic and en-
vironmental outcomes of Degrowth scenarios, we have devel-
oped a specific approach, involving participative surveys and 
supported by ad-hoc macro-economic modeling. Our prelim-
inary results, deriving from sensitivity analyses, already dem-
onstrate the importance of structural, cultural and social, non-
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technical factors involved in or influenced by Degrowth pro-
posals. They suggest that energy and environmental issues 
cannot be considered apart from broader societal projects. Fur-
ther results, including scenario modeling and assessment, are 
to come soon.
Of course, in addition to the inherent complexity of natural 
and social systems, the qualitative nature of many Degrowth 
proposals remains a major obstacle to its transcription within 
an applied modeling framework. Yet, applied modeling may 
still prove valuable to the Degrowth debate. If used critically 
and with circumspection to question our intuitions and beliefs, 
it may help open the way to alternative social imaginaries and 
thus, together with voluntary social experiments that it cannot 
substitute, contribute to the continuous collective elaboration 
of a new societal paradigm. Let us take care not to fall along the 
way into what Alfred North Whitehead (1925) has termed “The 
Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness”.
Annotation
[1] Our model has been developed with the system dynamics modeling 
 software STELLA.
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